Interaction between the NHS and the private healthcare sector attracts regular media attention due to its wide relevance 7 and the antithetical juxtaposition of universal access and a 'two-tier' system -with descriptions such as 'going private' (understood here as a patient opting for private rather than NHS treatment) 8 or 'NHS privatisation' (typically referencing the expansion of private sector delivery of NHS services from the early 2000s onwards).
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Thus patient choice of NHS or private provider, specifically in the contexts of patients moving between the NHS and private healthcare sector and within NHS competition reforms, deserves more attention than it has hitherto received from the academic law community. 10 Questions of applicability of competition law to the NHS 11 have been considered, but movement between the NHS and private healthcare has been examined in the context of an overview of the NHS, 12 or from the perspective of allocation and public law rather than competition. 13 The private healthcare sector has also received little academic attention 14 -although this may change with greater availability of information 7 This presupposes entitlement to NHS healthcare provision and the means to access private healthcare, so is clearly to be distinguished from instances of restrictions on access to NHS services for overseas visitors, or the ability of patients to exercise choice in respect of specialist commissioning, for example in the context of longterm care where a patient may receive NHS Continuing Care Funding or a Personal Health Budget based on their complex healthcare needs and be entitled to exercise choice in respect of how this money is used. However, such examples could certainly form the basis for further research. 8 L Donnelly 'Numbers 'going private' for surgery soaring as NHS rationing deepens' (The Telegraph, 11 August 2018). Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 'Going private at Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust', available at file:///C:/Users/owner/Downloads/Going%20Private.pdf (last accessed 30 September 2018). Oaks Hospital '
Step-by-step guide to going private at Oaks', available at https://www.oakshospital.co.uk/aboutus/going-private (last accessed 30 September 2018). However, what might be considered 'NHS privatisation' extends beyond patient choice policies, further blurring the distinction with the concept of 'going private'. This is because 'privatisation' can be considered a misnomer insofar as a distinction can be drawn between private providers undertaking work for the NHS, and an NHS provider being taken into private ownership. 46 Examples of the former can be seen from the inception of the NHS in 1948, and include elective, diagnostic, musculoskeletal, pharmaceutical and children's services, 47 supporting the view that the relationship between the NHS and private healthcare sector is at its best when cast in a collaborative light. Perhaps the closest example of the latter is still to be found in recent experiments with franchising arrangements which met with limited success. 48 Insofar as NHS patients may not be aware 'The NHS dominates healthcare in the UK. Without it private elective and acute healthcare would not exist in its present form, and it must be seen in this context.'
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More recently, private healthcare companies have also effectively acknowledged this by using income from NHS contracts to compensate for a decline in private patient numbers during the economic crisis. 53 Indeed, at the time of writing (September 2018), the additional dynamic of the NHS supporting private healthcare providers by encouraging CCGs to refer NHS patients has featured in the general media.
54
This background of interaction between the NHS and the private healthcare sector, and its influence on recent competition reforms, means discussion of patient choice can now be structured around two frameworks.
CONCEPTUALISING PATIENT CHOICE WITHIN TWO FRAMEWORKS
This section builds on the foregoing by outlining two frameworks for patient choice: between the NHS and the private healthcare sector, and choice within the NHS, which can be linked to 'going private' and 'NHS privatisation', respectively. 58 In contrast to 'co-payment', which is permitted by virtue of the Government passing Regulations which require patients to make a contribution to the overall cost of NHS-commissioned care. See NHS England, above n 23 at page 13. An example of 'co-payment' in this definition would be the levying of prescription charges. However, the terminology is contested: this article uses the definitions and terminology of NHS England to discuss 'co-funding' and 'co-payment'. Elsewhere, 'co-payment' has been used to describe what may be considered a 'co-funding' arrangement using NHS England terminology. See, for example, A Weale and S Clark 'Co-payments in the NHS: an analysis of the normative arguments', (2010) 5 Health Economics, Policy and Law 225. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. NHS top-ups and voucher schemes for specified unfunded drugs are also referenced. (I) THE NHS CONSTITUTION NHS patients have 'rights', including choice, enshrined in the NHS Constitution. 77 The rights regarding 'Informed Choice' can be linked to a wider legal basis with regard to patients choosing GP practice, expressing a preference for a particular doctor within a GP practice, and having access to transparent data to facilitate choice. 78 Of particular relevance to the present discussion is the 'right' for NHS patients to make choices about the services commissioned by NHS bodies, 79 The ability of patients to exercise choice of NHS or private provider has changed over time and continues to develop as boundaries between NHS and private healthcare become more porous. As scope for movement between the NHS and private healthcare (and indeed, the development of competition reforms) can vary across England, the present discussion is concerned with the general principles, rules and relevant law underpinning this movement, with general distinctions being drawn between primary and secondary healthcare provision.
(I) PRIMARY HEALTHCARE PROVISION -CHOICE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONER (GP)
From the inception of the NHS, the 'gatekeeper' function of GPs in accessing healthcare services established a need for patients to register with a GP practice. Indeed, the launch of Consensus on where such a separation cannot be drawn emerges with the example of a patient needing a cataract operation and their request to insert a multifocal lens not routinely available on the NHS being declined. Reconceptualising patients as 'consumers' in NHS competition reforms raises at least two concerns. One is recognised in the context of citizenship, namely that 'we do not come to the marketplace as equals '. 118 This reflects the controversies attached to the 'NHS patientprivate patient' framework -notably the potential conflict arising from ongoing commitment to maintaining NHS healthcare provision on the basis of clinical need, not the ability to pay.
A second concern is a shift in status from passive patients to active consumers, 119 which has implications for the doctor-patient relationship in both frameworks. Within the 'NHS patient -private patient' framework, the aforementioned DH guidance may be interpreted as casting doctors in a somewhat paternalistic light by delineating a framework for sharing information with patients. This appears out of step with more recent developments -the 2012 Act reforms and CMA development of the private healthcare market -which appear to strengthen the patient's position. Further, this may be concerning since this guidance was produced against the backdrop of competition as conceived by New Labour, yet appears to be replicated without revision by CCGs in the post-2012 Act environment. Alternatively, the DH and BMA guidance may be considered to strengthen a patient's hand in seeking access to private healthcare, with the doctor being re-cast as facilitator.
In contrast, within the 'NHS patient choice' framework, the doctor's role may clearly be construed as more paternalistic -by making patients aware that they may choose a private provider in certain circumstances. This is consistent with the logic that a 'patients-asconsumers' narrative may be misplaced in the context of the NHS, which -in contrast to the private healthcare market -can at most share only some standard market characteristics, with provider exit proving most controversial. Table 1 shows that NHS patients may be considered consumers of NHS providers such as NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts (category 1), or of private healthcare providers who deliver NHS services (category 2). Categories 1 and 2 equate to the 'NHS patient choice' framework outlined above. NHS commissioners -NHS England for specialist services, and CCGs -are similarly consumers for categories 1 and 2. Conversely, PMI companies and private patients who use their own means ('self-pay patients') are consumers of the private healthcare market, whether treated by NHS providers or private healthcare providers in categories 3 and 4, respectively. Thus the 'NHS patient -private patient' framework reflects movement by a patient from categories 1 and 2 to categories 3 and 4, and the associated change in status (from 'NHS patient' to 'private patient') according to the aforementioned DH and NHS England guidance. Table 1 also suggests a distinction between NHS patients and private patients on the one hand, and NHS Commissioners and PMI companies on the other. This is deliberate since the latter are effectively acting as agents for patients to exercise choice -'choice' as exercised by private or NHS patients themselves is restricted, respectively, to a relatively small selection of PMI providers operating across the UK 122 or to the NHS Commissioner available in a given geographical region.
Although PMI providers can be considered consumers of private healthcare, the focus here is on NHS patients, self-pay patients and NHS commissioners as these have all been considered to serve a function analogous to consumers in the context of NHS competition reforms. Thus, in the context of the New Labour reforms, emphasis was placed on protecting both NHS patients and commissioners from anticompetitive behaviour. 123 The CMA has recognised 'the NHS' (explicitly comprising NHS commissioners, but presumably extending to NHS patients) as the 'end customer' in cases where large pharmaceutical companies have been found to engage in anticompetitive behaviour, for example by overcharging the NHS for particular drugs. 124 By recognising NHS commissioners as end customers, it appears possible to interpret this as relating, at least indirectly, to NHS patients. Nevertheless, a distinction perhaps emerges in arguments about NHS (commissioners) countervailing buyer power to constrain anticompetitive behaviour by suppliers in such cases. 125 Indeed, the explicit CMA recognition of NHS patients (as distinct from NHS commissioners) as consumers appears limited to using the 'relevant patient benefits' exception 126 to approve NHS Foundation Trust mergers against the backdrop of the current NHS policy focus on integrated care.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that choice may be exercised not only by patients, but also by other parties acting as agents on behalf of patients, prompting questions of how patient choice links first to competition, as distinct from competition law, and then how patient choice relates to competition law. 136 It is worth noting that EU free movement case law regarding patients accessing treatment in different Member States ('health tourism') has received some attention in discussions of competition law and healthcare. However, this is beyond the scope of the present discussion of patient choice within the English system, other than to note that NHS patients may be considered to have a 'choice' of receiving treatment abroad under free movement case law which finds expression as a 'right' within Section 3a of the NHS Constitution (above n 45). 137 Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Section 2, Competition Act 1998 (CA98) -also known as the "Chapter I" Prohibition. 138 Article 102 TFEU. Section 18 CA98 -also known as the "Chapter II" Prohibition. 139 Overall, it appears that despite the bracketing together of 'choice and competition' under New Labour policies to legitimise the expansion of private sector delivery of NHS services, the two concepts may become increasingly separate following the 2012 Act reforms.
PATIENT CHOICE IN ENGLISH HEALTHCARE AND COMPETITION REFORMS
Recent competition reforms affect patient choice in English healthcare in two ways. insight into who would make use of the provisions, with the limited probability that it may be individual patients who pursue their entitlement to adequate information for making meaningful choices. Interestingly, such considerations also come into play with the CMA's current development of the private healthcare market. The CMA defines the private healthcare market in terms of NHS providers treating private patients via PPUs and private providers treating private patients (categories 3 and 4 in Table   1 above). NHS activity undertaken by private providers (category 2 in Table 1 above) is not included, although the CMA recognises that this forms part of the business model of some private providers.
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The CMA's 2014 market investigation identified various aspects where there is an adverse effect on competition which hinders the market from working effectively. For the purposes of the present discussion, these related to the limited availability of information available to private patients which was considered to inhibit their ability to make choices between NHS and private providers. The CMA's remedy was to appoint the Private Healthcare 155 Ibid.
Information Network (PHIN) as an 'Information Organisation' and to impose requirements on NHS and private providers to supply information. The intention is for data to be collated and made available on PHIN's website for private patients to access. Information to be provided comprises a range of performance measures disaggregated by procedure at both hospital and consultant level. 156 These relate, inter alia, to infection rates, mortality rates, unplanned patient transfers (from a private healthcare facility to an NHS facility), and procedure-specific measures of improvement in health outcomes.
At the time of writing (September 2018), the CMA has taken action against seven NHS Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts 157 by issuing directions requiring these, inter alia, to share relevant data with PHIN, pay subscriptions to PHIN and start systematic collection of patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) specified by PHIN. 158 This intervention by the CMA intervention on behalf of patients as consumers of healthcare may be welcome as a step to facilitating patient choice in general terms, but may ultimately only benefit a minority of private patients, rather than the majority of the patient body (NHS patients).
CONCLUSIONS
This article started from the premise that the concept of patient choice can offer mutual insights into movement between the NHS and private healthcare and recent competition reforms which have thus far been underexplored. By juxtaposing the 'NHS patient-private patient' and 'NHS patient choice' frameworks it has been possible to facilitate understanding and progress discussions of the complex and controversial subject of private healthcare and NHS interaction. This has led to three main insights. suggested that maintaining a strict separation between NHS and private healthcare may appear unduly bureaucratic. Furthermore, the argument that it may be difficult to distinguish between acting in a patient's best interests from a purely clinical perspective and avoiding any suggestion of benefits accruing to a GP or private provider may seem less persuasive if the alternative is to leave patients to muddle through without relevant, comprehensible information on which to base meaningful choices.
Finally, raising awareness of the distinction between competition (law) and patient choice is significant -and especially so when it can be suggested that the knitting together of the two
